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In the Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses judgment the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) deemed that on the basis of Article 19(1) TEU it is competent to
evaluate the guarantee of independence of judges if only they sit in a national court that
may apply and interpret EU law. In light of this ruling, the European Commission in the
infringement proceedings against Poland does not have to restrict itself to the slightly
modified “Hungarian scenario” (hitherto preferred by it). It may instead once again analyse
the scope of charges with regard to the Common Courts System Act (the CCS Act), and
may even lodge a new complaint concerning i.a. the Act on the Supreme Court.
(1) It is remarkable how quickly and flexibly the CJEU has reacted in its legal decisions to
the crisis of rule of law in certain EU Member States. Above all, it has built up in its case
law a catalogue of elements constituting the rule of law within the meaning of Article  2
TEU, such as the principle of division of power (C-477/16 Kovalkovas), the principle of
effective judicial protection (C-72/15 Rosnieft), and effective application of EU law (C-
441/17 R Commission v. Poland). Following this last order of the CJEU, it may be seen that
the CJEU does not hesitate to issue courageous decisions securing the effectiveness of
EU law, e.g. by way of interpretation of Article 279 TFEU allowing of penalty payments for
not respecting the CJEU order for interim measures regarding Poland’s Puszcza
Białowieska site. Just such a courageous decision is also undoubtedly the judgment in the
case Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, which may have a precedent-setting
character of constitutional importance for the European Union and EU Member States. For
the first time the CJEU stated that Article 19(1) TEU (principle of effective judicial
protection), in itself, enables – under certain conditions – review of national legislation as
regards the standard of independence of judges (confirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU). This type of control will be possible if national courts (in the
meaning of Article 267 TFEU) can interpret or apply EU law.
(2) In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses the national court (Tribunal de Contas),
from which the judges originated who challenged the decisions issued with regard to them
concerning a decrease of remuneration (which supposedly infringed their independence),
could decide both cases without a EU element, and those which contain such an element
(e.g. cases concerning funds coming from the EU, as well as issues related to public
expenditure or the public debt, in particular as part of procedures for allocating public
contracts). In other words, the fact that the national court had the competence to potentially
apply or interpret EU law was sufficient to accept that the guarantees concerning its
independence are covered by EU law according to Article 19(1) TEU. It seems therefore
that in that case, in order to evaluate the independence of a national court, it is not
necessary to show an EU element following from  sources (e.g. a directive or one of the
freedoms of the EU internal market) other than the possibility of applying EU law, which
itself triggers Article 19(1) TEU. In particular, the CJEU did not accept that the potential EU
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background of the provisions themselves decreasing the judges’ remuneration is of
importance in this regard (related in a way to the requirements of an excessive budget
deficit and the EU financial assistance programme).
(3) The judgement Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses thus shows that the CJEU
has an express Treaty competence to evaluate judicial systems in the EU Member States,
while the courts’ structure of the Member States should be prepared ‘in advance’ for a
situation where the national courts were entrusted to decide also cases concerning EU law.
This preparation assumes that the courts meet the standard of independence required by
EU law (Article 19(1) TEU/Art. 47 CHFF). This is the case in view of the key role of national
courts in the EU system of legal protection. In the opinion of the CJEU, Article 19 TEU
gives a concrete expression to the value of the rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU, as well
as secures the mutual trust between the courts of the Member States that the values
expressed in Article 2 TEU will be complied with. The CJEU also emphasized the key role
played by national courts for the EU system of legal protection, application and respect for
EU law, as well as for the protection of individuals (i.e. inter alios, natural persons and legal
entities). Since individuals have the right to challenge each act concerning application of
EU law, Member States have the task, pursuant to the principle of loyalty (Article 4(3)
TEU), to establish a system of remedies and procedures which ensure effective judicial
protection. In “areas covered by EU law”, in the meaning of Art. 19 (1) TEU, national courts
must therefore meet EU standards of independence. It seems to follow from Associação
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses that the CJEU will evaluate differently the scope of
application of Art. 19(1) TEU and the CHFR (Art. 51 CHFR). This is because Art. 19(1) TEU
covers also situations in which national courts may potentially apply EU law, whereas the
CHFR pertains only to cases of actual application of EU law by the Member States.
(4) The judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses opens new prospects for
the European Commission in its fight for the rule of law in Poland with regard to
infringement proceedings (Art. 258 TFEU). This judgment may induce the Commission
above all to once again consider the scope of charges which the Commission intends to
bring against Poland in relation to the Act on Common Courts (hereinafter: “the ACC”). As I
have written elsewhere, it follows from the brief press release of the EC of 20.12.2017 that
in the context of the ACC the Commission intends to bring charges against Poland – in
proceedings for a declaration of an infringement of the obligations following from the
Treaties – concerning (a) a breach of the ban on discrimination for reason of age in the
case of retirement age of judges, and (b) a breach of the independence of the national
courts (art. 19 (1) TEU/Art. 47 CHFF) in relation to the consent which the Minister for
Justice expresses (according to discretionary criteria) to the continued holding of a position
by a judge who has reached retirement age. With regard to these charges the EU element
(and the possibility of an evaluation of independence according to EU standards) is found
above all in Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and
occupation.
(5) In light of earlier press releases, at the prejudicial stage of the art. 258 TFEU
proceedings the Commission, pointing to a breach of art. 19 (1) TEU/art. 47 CHFF, also
voiced reservations concerning the provisions of the ACC which allow the Minister for
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Justice to appoint and remove, at his discretion, presidents (vice presidents) of courts. In
the release of 12.09.2017 in relation to the issue of the reasoned opinion the EC stated that
the “discretionary power to dismiss and appoint Court Presidents allows the Minister of
Justice to exert influence over these judges when they are adjudicating cases involving the
application of EU law”. However, already in the release issued in relation to the initiation of
proceedings before the CJEU (20.12.2017) there is no reference to this national regulation.
The EC did not show the reasons for which it resigned from bringing this charge. However,
taking into account the hitherto case law of the CJEU, this charge could have involved
significant difficulties as regards showing precisely this EU element, without which an
evaluation cannot be made of the standard of independence following from Art. 19 (1)
TEU/Art. 47 CHFF. The difficulty consisted in the fact that the Commission would have to
show this EU element exclusively when applying the reasoning referring to the general role
of the national courts in the EU legal system. This would be a task more difficult than in a
situation in which a justification is available relating directly to a specific secondary legal act
(directive), as in the case of the remaining charges. The judgment Associação Sindical dos
Juízes Portugueses opens up a new perspective in this regard as the CJEU accepted that it
is precisely the general role of the national courts in the EU legal system, related to the
application and interpretation of EU law (in understanding and cooperation with the CJEU
as part of the prejudicial procedure), which constitutes sufficient justification to examine the
case as regards fulfilment of the requirement of independence following from Art. 19 (1)
TEU/Art. 47 CHFF. This means that the ACC which, in principle, in the aspect relating to
the appointment and removal of court presidents, in itself has no EU background and falls
within the scope of exclusive competence of the Member State, will however be able to be
examined as regards EU law standards.
(6) The judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses may also constitute an
opportunity for the Commission to approach – in proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU – the
relation of the judiciary and the executive powers in a more comprehensive way. The
hitherto position of the Commission may be evaluated as fragmentary, as opposed to the
evaluation presented by the Venice Commission which in its opinion of 11.12.2017 showed
that the powers of the Minister for Justice should not be analysed independently, but in a
certain system context (i.e. with account taken of other ministerial powers in the area of the
judicial system, with regard to judges and court presidents). The Venice Commission also
pointed out that the Attorney General who, as the superior of all the prosecutors appearing
in courts, has a specific interest in a given resolution of a case, also holds the position of
Minister for Justice, having in turn specific powers with regard to courts and individual
judges. In the opinion of the Venice Commission, the combination of these factors not only
increases the negative effect which is created by each of them independently, but jointly
creates a serious risk for the independence of the judicial system in Poland. Undoubtedly,
as seen by the Commission, in the light of the judgment of the ECHR in the case Baka v.
Hungary, in a specific case the removal of a court president from his function may be of key
importance for ensuring the independence of the judicial powers. Showing this problem in a
broader context could strengthen the argumentation of the European Commission in
proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU.
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(7) Moreover, the judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses may allow the
Commission to carry out infringement proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU with regard to a
broader range of charges covered by the Recommendations of the Commission regarding
the Rule of Law in Poland and by the motion of the Commission filed under Art. 7 (1) TEU,
such as e.g. the new rules concerning the National Council of the Judiciary. In particular,
the case Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses makes it possible to start
proceedings with regard to the Act on the Supreme Court which will enter into force on
3.04.2018. Pursuant to that Act, inter alia, the retirement age of Supreme Court (SC)
judges was reduced from 70 to 65 years, which will affect about 40% of the present SC
judges. In the opinion of the Commission, this will give rise to a problem in particular in the
context of the principle of the irremovability of judges. What is more, the possibility of a SC
judge continuing to hold his/her position will be dependent upon a discretionary decision of
the President of the Republic of Poland. He may twice consent to the continued
performance of the function, each time for 3 years. This gives rise to a similar problem
concerning the independence of courts in light of Art. 19 TEU and Art. 47 KPP EU, as with
regard to judges of common courts, which problem the EC has already made the subject of
proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU. However, in the case of SC judges so far there has been
no possibility to introduce the EU element following from Directive 2006/54/EC (like in the
case of judges of common courts) as the SC Act does not discriminate with the retirement
age as regards gender since female SC judges can voluntarily retire at 60 years of age.
Also, basing the charge on a breach of the ban on discrimination for reason of age, as in
the Hungarian case (C-288/12), could be difficult. To recall, Hungary removed the
infringement identified by the CJEU concerning the lowering of the retirement age of judges
(from 70 to 62 years of age), increasing this age to 65, which the Commission no longer
questioned. The judgment Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses opens up for the
Commission new possibilities in this regard for evaluating the principles of effective judicial
protection, independence of judges and their irremovability from office, in isolation from
discrimination for reason of gender or age.
(8) What is more, the experience with the Hungarian cases also showed that the departure
of judges from the profession and performance of the functions in view of retirement age
gives rise to practically irreversible effects regarding a return to the profession and the
functions performed. In the case of the Polish SC, inter alia, the First President of the SC
will in this way lose her function, as well as many experienced judges. Drawing conclusions
from the Hungarian case, for the effectiveness of a possible intervention by the
Commission in the context of the SC Act (but also on the Common Courts Act) of key
importance will be whether the Commission files a motion for interim measures by way of a
suspension of application of the statutory regulations until such time as the case has been
decided on by the CJEU. This is because with regard to Hungary the effectiveness of the
judgment of the CJEU declaring an infringement, though issued in an accelerated
procedure, proved negligible.
(9) Taking into account the potentially weak effectiveness of the procedure under Art. 7
TEU, the Commission could successfully avail itself of Art. 258 TFEU, where there is no
room for political discretion. The Commission’s press release of 20.12.2017 showed that
the Commission did not intend, at that point, to initiate courageous and precedent-setting
proceedings before the CJEU in the fight for the rule of law. But now in Associação
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Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses the CJEU opened the door for the Commission for it to
take, in proceedings under Art. 258 TFEU, a new (from the point of view of the rule of law)
and more effective path than to date. The clock is ticking, in particular as regards the SC
judges. It depends only on the Commission whether it will allow that the values expressed
in Art. 2 TEU be merely set down on paper, or whether it will attempt to convince the CJEU
that these values have – in the case of Poland – been breached. The green light shown by
the CJEU could not be greener.
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